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The WTO Decision on U.S. Cotton Policy
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 3/9/07
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, Calves
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  50 lbs, FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,     
  51-52% Lean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$85.43
131.67
106.16
148.22
57.86
56.44
65.70
79.00
215.73
$89.69
117.90
99.26
143.34
64.33
68.27
63.37
88.37
240.14
$98.10
127.35
104.82
155.70
59.42
76.30
68.32
85.25
244.63
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Columbus, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.08
1.93
5.42
2.86
1.99
4.36
3.84
6.98
6.23
2.64
4.59
3.90
7.13
6.48
2.74
Hay
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
130.00
65.00
55.00
135.00
92.50
90.00
       *
       *
       *
* No market.
In 2002, Brazil filed a complaint about U.S. cotton policies
with the World Trade Organization (WTO). After initial
consultations and review of the Brazilian complaint, the WTO
established a dispute resolution panel in March 2003. The panel
returned a ruling in favor of most of the objections in Brazil’s
petition in September 2004. The United States appealed this
decision but the WTO Appellate Body upheld the original
judgment in a ruling issued on March 3, 2005. The cotton subsidy
case is of importance for the U.S. cotton industry, but it also has
implications for other U.S. commodities. The federal programs
used to support grains and oilseeds are similar to the ones found
to be in violation of the United States’ WTO commitments in the
cotton case.
Textile production in the United States has been in decline
for many years as a result of competition from low-cost producers
in Asia. In addition, an international agreement known as the
Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) that had protected U.S. textile
mills was terminated in January 2005, and this may have
accelerated the decline of U.S. textile manufacturing. As domestic
demand for cotton has fallen, the proportion of the cotton crop
that is exported has increased. In recent years, more than 75
percent of the cotton produced in the United States has been
exported and the United States now accounts for almost 40
percent of world cotton exports. Prior to 2001, U.S. cotton
exports were generally in the range of 5 to 7 million bales per
year, averaging about 43 percent of total U.S. production. In
2005, U.S. exports reached 18 million bales (ERS/USDA).
Brazil’s action was triggered in part by a precipitous decline
in the world cotton price, which fell 55 percent between 1994 and
2001. The Brazilian government argued that lower prices were the
result of U.S. cotton subsidies. Cotton policies in the United
States have been referred to as a “Three-Step Competitiveness
Program” (Shurley). Step One is the marketing loan program
(including loan deficiency payments) that is available for other
program crops. The Step Two program provided marketing
certificates to compensate U.S. cotton exporters and domestic
cotton users for the difference between U.S. prices and lower
world prices. Step Three allows for increases in the U.S. import
quota if there appear to be shortages in the United States
(Shurley). In addition to these program elements, cotton
producers benefit from direct and counter-cyclical payments as
defined in the 2002 Farm Bill and export programs such as the
GSM 102 and GSM 103 programs which provide export credit
guarantees.      
The Brazilian complaint challenged all of these policies and
included statistical evidence that  U.S. policies had caused world
prices to fall, costing Brazil an estimated $600 million in 2001
(Schnepf, 2005). The dispute resolution panel identified certain
U.S. cotton programs as “prohibited” subsidies while others were
classed as “actionable” subsidies. The panel ruled that prohibited
subsidies be eliminated within six months of the ruling and that
the actionable subsidies be modified so as to remove the parts
that were causing damage to Brazil and other cotton exporters
(Schnepf, 2006). The prohibited subsidies are the Step Two
program and the export credit guarantees (GSM 102/103). The
U.S. government eliminated the Step Two program in August
2006 while the subsidy elements in the export credit guarantee
programs were removed in 2005 (Schnepf, 2006). 
The actionable subsidies include marketing loan provisions
and counter-cyclical payments. For these subsidies, the United
States is encouraged to make modifications in its policies so that
they would no longer cause serious adverse effects in Brazil. To
fully understand the implications of this part of the ruling, it is
necessary to review the provisions of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture (AA) with respect to trade-distorting domestic
policies. The AA established three boxes into which various
agricultural policies are classed. Policies such as conservation
programs that have little impact on trade are placed in the green
box and need not be adjusted. Policies identified as trade
distorting are placed in the amber box and the AA requires an
average reduction in these policies of 21 percent relative to an
aggregate measure of support. The third box, the blue box, is for
policies that may influence production decisions and therefore
have trade distorting effects but are contingent on production
controls or other measures that offset the trade effects. Blue box
policies do not need to be modified to comply with the AA. 
In the past, the United States has argued that direct
payments, counter-cyclical payments and the marketing loan
program should be placed in the blue box. The dispute resolution
panel in the cotton case ruled to the contrary, that these are
amber box policies subject to the limitations applied to other
trade-distorting domestic policies. So far, the particular actions
to be taken by the United States to comply with the ruling on
actionable cotton subsidies are still being worked out. According
to one source, Brazil has elected not to pursue the actionable
subsidies for the time being because of the expectation that these
will be modified in the course of the Doha Round of trade
negotiations (Schnepf, 2006). 
Most analyses of the impact of the cotton policy changes that
have been made or that may be made in the future suggest that
there will be fairly limited impacts on cotton prices and trade. A
study by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute
(FAPRI) predicted a decline of less than 2 percent in the volume
of U.S. exports, a decline of 1.3 cents per pound in U.S. cotton
prices and an increase of 0.4 cents per pound in the world price
as a result of eliminating the Step Two program. Note that the
loan rate for U.S. upland cotton was set at 52 cents per pound for
2002-2007. It may turn out, however, that in the long-run these
policy changes will have greater impacts on the U.S. cotton
industry. The International Cotton Advisory Committee found
that the cost of producing cotton in the United States is the highest
in the world suggesting that the United States does not have a
comparative advantage in cotton. Under these circumstances, the
U.S. cotton sector would be expected to decline quite substantially
over time if the subsidies are eliminated. 
Beyond the immediate effects on U.S. cotton, the WTO
decision has important implications for other agricultural sectors
in the United States. Encouraged by the precedent set by the
cotton case, Canada filed a complaint against the U.S. corn
program in January 2007, citing many of the same programs that
had been found actionable in the cotton case (Schnepf, 2007). If
the cotton decision is carried over to other commodities,
marketing loan provisions, counter-cyclical payments and direct
payments all risk being reclassified as amber box policies that
would be subject to reductions. In 2007, a new Farm Bill will be
crafted and the Bush administration has proposed shifting the
orientation of this bill in favor of conservation programs and
biofuel research at the expense of some of the programs that have
been challenged in the WTO. This reorientation of farm policy in
the United States may be due in part to the ruling on Brazil’s
cotton complaint. Of course, more traditional approaches to farm
policy may be reinstated by the House and Senate but it is likely
that the U.S. government will find that it is in the broad national
interest to pay close attention to the cotton decision as it crafts
future farm legislation.      
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